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SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
     We are asked to consider once again the proper allocation of 
burdens in cases involving allegations of discriminatory 
employment actions.  Cases of this nature inevitably raise thorny 
issues because they typically require the plaintiff to establish 
proof of the employer's intent not through direct evidence, which 
is rarely available, but through complex inferential schemes. 
     The issue in the specific matter before us concerns the 
elements of a prima facie case under the familiar McDonnell 
Douglas scheme in a case in which the plaintiff-employee was 
terminated, allegedly as the result of a reduction in the 
employer's workforce.  The case raises as well issues involving 
the scope of the exceptions to the New Jersey Family & Medical 
Leave Act, the enforceability of communications by an employer as 
an implied contract, and the extent of liability of a parent 
corporation for its subsidiary's employment decisions. 
 
                 I. Facts and procedural posture 
     Even by the standards of the acrimonious world of 
litigation, there is little in this case about which the parties 
agree.  They agree that appellant, Catherine Marzano, was hired 
by one of the appellees, Computer Science Corp., in September 
1990; that she went on maternity leave in July 1993; that she 
gave birth to her son the next month; and that she was laid off 
on October 5, 1993.  Beyond this bare-bones chronology, however, 
much is in dispute: who Ms. Marzano's employer was at any one 
time; how well that employer, whoever it was, was doing 
financially, and how we should determine this; what Ms. Marzano's 
job entailed; what the jobs of people hired after she was laid 
off entailed, and what qualifications were required to perform 
those respective jobs; why she was laid off; and who needs to 
establish the reason and what is necessary to do so. 
     Of one thing we are certain: on September 5, 1990, Ms. 
Marzano was hired by Computer Science Corporation ("CSC") as a 
"junior technical recruiter."  Her contract indicates that she 
was hired as an at-will employee.  She was assigned to work in a 
division of CSC named CSD in Piscataway, New Jersey. 
     At some later point, CSD was merged with CSC Partners, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of CSC.  It is not entirely clear when 
the merger occurred.  Defendants state that CSD and CSC Partners 
were "functionally merged" in April 1991, Appellees' Brief at 4; 
see App. at DAS 74; DAS 178-79, and that after the merger, all 
CSD employees became employees of CSC Partners. 
     According to testimony by officials of CSC Partners, at the 
time of the merger Partners was comprised of twelve separate 
business units.  Defendants describe a business unit as "a 
revenue generation and profit and loss center for delivering 
consulting systems, integration and development work to its 
client base."  App. at DAS 138.  Most of the units are organized 
around a region.  App. at DAS 183.  There are, for instance, 
Chicago, Minneapolis, and NY Metro units.  One unit, however, was 
allegedly "devoted exclusively to servicing AT&T on a national 
basis."  Appellees' Brief at 5; see App. at DAS 184-85.  That 
unit was known as the AT&T National Business Unit. 
     According to Ms. Marzano's affidavit, the merger had little 
effect on her day-to-day worklife, to the point where she states 
that she "continued to consider herself a CSC employee."  
Appellant's Brief at 5.  More significantly, she allegedly 
continued to collect paychecks from CSC for some time after the 
merger allegedly occurred.  App. at A225. 
     Ms. Marzano's performance seems to have been satisfactory or 
better throughout her tenure at CSC and CSC Partners.  After 
seven months of employment, she received a twenty-percent salary 
increase and a "good" performance review by her supervisor, App. 
at A227, and she received other positive feedback from the 
company.  See, e.g., App. at A252. 
     In June 1991, Ms. Marzano was assigned to a new position.  
She contends that she was promoted to account executive for the 
Sales Division, App. at A227.  Defendants, on the other hand, 
state that "her duties were modified to an administrative support 
role for the Bell Labs account" following a reduction of 
personnel at CSC Partners.  App. at DA3.  In any case, Ms. 
Marzano states that she received a "very good" evaluation at the 
end of that year.  App. at A228. 
     In April 1992, she became marketing administrator for the 
AT&T National Account; she received a ten-percent salary increase 
and an "above-average" rating in her evaluation at the end of 
that year.  App. at A228, A231. 
     Mr. Marzi stated in a deposition that he was hired as 
business unit manager of the AT&T Unit in September 1992.  App. 
at DAS 134.  After reviewing the Unit's marketing plan and 
finding it ineffective, he discontinued it and reassigned the 
marketing personnel.  App. at DAS 142-47.  As a result of the 
changes, Ms. Marzano's duties were allegedly reassigned to 
provide administrative support to Mr. Marzi.  App. at DAS 147-49. 
     In January 1993, Ms. Marzano informed Mr. Marzi that she 
would be going on maternity leave in July.  According to her 
affidavit, shortly before going on leave Mr. Marzi told her that 
she would receive additional responsibilities when she returned, 
and gave no indication that her position might be in jeopardy.  
App. at A231.  She further asserts that when she left on 
maternity leave, she had a conversation with Mr. Marzi in which 
he spoke to her "as if [she] wasn't coming back."  App. at A232.  
Ms. Marzano allegedly reassured Mr. Marzi that she intended to 
return immediately after maternity leave.  Id. 
     According to Mr. Marzi's deposition, the AT&T Unit started 
experiencing "significant losses" beginning in the spring of 1993 
as a result of AT&T's own financial difficulties, which led the 
telephone company to curtail its spending on consulting work.  
App. at DAS 136-37.  As a result, the AT&T Unit allegedly started 
considering the need for staff reductions.  According to 
Defendants, Ms. Marzano's position was particularly vulnerable 
because her salary was "non-billable" and non-revenue-generating, 
and her position "non-essential."  Appellees' Brief at 9.  
Defendants allege that Mr. Marzi initially tried to "identify a 
more essential role for plaintiff following her leave," id., but 
after financial conditions worsened, decided to eliminate her 
position altogether along with nine others out of some fifty 
positions in the AT&T Unit in New Jersey.  Id. at 10.  (According 
to Defendants, the AT&T Unit was eventually merged into the NY 
Metro Business Unit in March 1994.  App. at DAS 139.) 
     In any case, Ms. Marzano went on maternity leave on July 27, 
1993 and gave birth to her son on August 14, 1993.  App. at A232.  
Mr. Marzi allegedly called her a few weeks later to tell her that 
her position was being "eliminated" and that she was fired.  Id.  
On October 5, 1993, CSC Partners sent Ms. Marzano a letter of 
termination confirming the bad news and attributing the decision 
to a reduction in force in the AT&T Business Unit caused by 
financial difficulties.  App. at DA47.  Ms. Marzano asserts in 
her affidavit that she went to speak with Mr. Marzi shortly after 
her termination, and that he told her "how his wife had collected 
unemployment so [that] she could stay home with their kids and 
how [Ms. Marzano] might be 'better off' if [she] could stay home 
with [her] son and collect unemployment."  App. at 233. 
     On November 1, 1993, Mr. Marzi circulated a memorandum to 
the "AT&T National Business Unit" and the "NY Metro Business 
Unit" announcing the consolidation of certain "services and 
functions" of the two units, and advertising three positions: 
administrative manager and marketing manager, both to be filled 
immediately, and "general consulting practice manager" for NY 
Metro.  Ms. Marzano was, according to her affidavit, never 
advised of or considered for these positions.  App. at A234-35.  
Barbara Zelasko, a person from outside CSC and CSC Partners, was 
hired as marketing manager in March 1994. 
     Ms. Marzano asserts in her affidavit that pregnancy was 
referred to as the "kiss of death" at CSC because numerous female 
employees (at least seven, she states) had been terminated after 
taking maternity leave.  App. at A236. 
     Ms. Marzano instituted the instant action in response to her 
termination on May 18, 1994 by filing suit in the Superior Court 
of New Jersey against Computer Science Corporation and CSC 
Partners, Inc. ("Defendants").  In her complaint, Ms. Marzano 
alleged unlawful discrimination by Defendants on the basis of her 
pregnancy in violation of the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination, N.J.S.A.  10:5-12(a); unlawful interference with 
her rights under the New Jersey Family Leave Act, N.J.S.A.  
34:11B-9; and breach of an implied-in-fact employment contract 
based on Defendants' written policy.  The case was removed to the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey based 
on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C.  1332.   
     Defendants responded to Ms. Marzano's complaint with a 
motion for summary judgment on all counts, pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(c).  The district court granted the motion on August 
17, 1995, bringing the proceedings before that court to an end. 
     Ms. Marzano filed the instant appeal on August 28, 1995. 
   
                         II. Jurisdiction 
     This is a civil action between the citizens of different 
states, and the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $50,000.  
Therefore, the district court had original jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C.  1332(a)(1). 
     The district court issued an order granting Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment on August 17, 1995.  We have 
jurisdiction over an appeal from this final order pursuant to 28 
U.S.C.  1291. 
 
                     III. Standard of review 
     We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment 
by the district court, Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 
777 (3d Cir. 1994), and apply the same test that the district 
court should have applied.  Id. 
     Summary judgment should be granted if "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); seealso 
Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777.  In making its determination, 
the court should view the facts in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's 
favor.  Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777. 
     In an employment discrimination case, 
     the burden of persuasion on summary judgment remains 
     unalterably with [the employer] as movant.  The 
     employer must persuade the court that even if all of 
     the inferences which could reasonably be drawn from the 
     evidentiary materials of record were viewed in the 
     light most favorable to [the plaintiff], no reasonable 
     jury could find in [the plaintiff's] favor. 
Sorba v. Pennsylvania Drilling Co., Inc., 821 F.2d 200, 201-02 
(3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1019 (1988). 
 
             IV. The employment discrimination claim 
     Ms. Marzano first claims that by terminating her employment, 
the defendants unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis 
of her pregnancy, in violation of the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination, N.J.S.A.  10:5-12(a). 
     The district court analyzed Ms. Marzano's allegation as a 
claim of discrimination in a force-reduction setting.  District 
Opinion, typescript at 4 (citing Massarsky v. General Motors 
Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 
(1983)).  We have held that in order to establish a prima faciecase of 
this sort, "the plaintiff must show he was in the 
protected class, he was qualified, he was laid off and other 
unprotected workers were retained."  Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 
32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994).  The district court, by its own 
admission, rejected the "literal language of the retention 
requirement," District Opinion at 5, and held instead that  
     to establish a prima facie case in the context of a 
     work-force reduction, a plaintiff must do more than 
     merely show that unprotected employees were retained in 
     their positions; the plaintiff must produce some 
     additional evidence that he was singled out for 
     discharge because of his protected status. 
Id. at 5-6. 
     Based upon this novel standard, the district court found 
that "plaintiff has merely asserted that while she was 
terminated, other employees were retained," id. at 6, and that 
she had "failed to adduce any evidence of a nexus between her 
pregnancy and her discharge" and "to demonstrate that other, 
nonpregnant workers were treated more favorably."  Id.  As a 
result, the court concluded that Ms. Marzano had failed to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and that the 
defendants were entitled to summary judgment on this claim.  Id. 
     Ms. Marzano challenges the district court's conclusion on a 
number of grounds.  She argues, first of all, that no workforce 
reduction occurred, that accordingly the district court applied 
the wrong legal standard to her claim, and that under the proper 
legal standard she has established a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  Appellant's Brief at 27.  Second, Ms. Marzano 
argues that even if a workforce reduction did occur, the court 
did not apply the correct standard, id. at 30-34, and that, under 
the correct standard, Ms. Marzano has easily made a prima faciecase of 
discrimination.  Id. at 29.  Third, Ms. Marzano argues 
that even if the court did apply the right test, she did produce 
"additional evidence" of the defendants' discriminatory intent 
sufficient to meet her prima facie burden.  Finally, Ms. Marzano 
argues that she has produced sufficient evidence to allow a jury 
to conclude that any reason proffered by the defendants for her 
layoff is pretextual.  Id. at 38. 
         A. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme 
     The Supreme Court of New Jersey has adopted the methodology 
governing federal employment discrimination law for state claims 
of a similar nature.  See Clowes v. Terminix International, Inc., 
538 A.2d 794, 805 (N.J. 1988); Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 446 
A.2d 486, 490-91 (N.J. 1982). 
     The United States Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), articulated the analytical 
framework for federal claims of employment discrimination in 
which the plaintiff seeks to make his or her case through 
circumstantial evidence.  McDonnell Douglas set forth the basic 
allocation of burdens among employer and employee and order of 
presentation of proof: 
     First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the 
     preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of 
     discrimination.  Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in 
     proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
     defendant "to articulate some legitimate, 
     nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."  
     Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the 
     plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a 
     preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate 
     reasons offered by the defendant were not its true 
     reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. 
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 
(1981) (citations omitted). 
     While the burden of production may shift, "[t]he ultimate 
burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all 
times with the plaintiff."  Id. at 253. 
     In McDonnell Douglas, the Court explained that the plaintiff 
could meet his or her prima facie burden  
     by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; 
     (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
     which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, 
     despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) 
     that, after his rejection, the position remained open 
     and the employer continued to seek applicants from 
     persons of complainant's qualifications. 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
     At the same time as it was articulating the elements of a 
prima facie case, the McDonnell Douglas Court explained in no 
uncertain terms that these elements might vary in "differing 
factual situations."  Id. at 802 n.13.  Similarly, we have often 
remarked that "'the nature of the required showing' to establish 
a prima facie case of disparate treatment by indirect evidence 
'depends on the circumstances of the case.'"  Torre v. Casio, 
Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Massarsky v. 
General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 n.13 (3d Cir.), cert.denied, 464 
U.S. 937 (1983)).  In the context of a claim of 
discriminatory termination of employment, for instance, we have 
held that the plaintiff must "prov[e] by a preponderance of the 
evidence that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was 
qualified for the position; (3) he was dismissed despite being 
qualified; and (4) he ultimately was replaced by a person 
[outside the protected class]."  Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, 
Inc., 814 F.2d 893, 897 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 438 U.S. 1052 
(1987); see also Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 728 
(3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2611 (1995); Torre, 42 
F.3d at 830 (same). 
     In a further effort to fine-tune our jurisprudence on the 
subject, we have held that the fourth prong of the prima facie 
case should be "relaxed" when the employee's layoff occurred in 
the context of a reduction in force.  Torre, 42 F.3d at 831.  In 
such a situation, "it obviously is unnecessary for the plaintiff 
to . . . show that he was actually replaced by" someone outside 
the protected class.  Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 118 n.13; see alsoDuffy v. 
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 n.3 
(3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984).  Rather, 
"it is sufficient to show that he was discharged, while the 
[employer] retained someone [outside the protected class]."  
Healy v. New York Life Insurance Co., 860 F.2d 1209, 1214 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1098 (1989); see also DiBiase 
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 723 n.2 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 306 (1995); Torre, 42 F.3d at 831; 
Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777; Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 
816 n.3 (3d Cir. 1991); Duffy, 738 F.2d at 1395 n.2; Massarsky, 
706 F.2d at 118. 
                    B. Reduction in workforce 
     We turn, first, to the threshold question of whether Ms. 
Marzano's employment was terminated as part of a reduction in 
workforce caused by financial distress, as Defendants claim.  It 
is worth noting that this question bears not only on what legal 
standard governs Ms. Marzano's discrimination claim, but on her 
two other claims as well. 
     The two parties disagree as to what is the appropriate work 
unit for us to consider in answering this question.  Ms. Marzano 
argues that her employer at the time of her layoff was CSC 
Partners.  She offers substantial evidence of CSC Partners's 
stellar financial performance in the years preceding and 
following her termination, including receipt of an Eagle Award 
for financial success in 1993 by the AT&T Business Unit.  App. at 
A194-96; see Appellant's Brief at 9-12.  In addition, she offers 
substantial evidence that CSC was also extremely profitable 
during the relevant time-period.  Id. at 8-9.  As a result, she 
suggests that Defendants' contention that she was laid off as the 
result of a reduction in workforce caused by financial distress 
is "not credible."  Id. at 36. 
     Defendants do not challenge Ms. Marzano's rosy account of 
their financial picture, and do not claim that Ms. Marzano was 
laid off as part of a workforce reduction in either CSC as a 
whole or CSC Partners as a whole caused by either firm's 
financial situation.  Appellees' Brief at 39.  Rather, they note 
that from the time of her termination, Ms. Marzano was 
consistently told that her layoff was caused by the deteriorating 
financial situation of the division of CSC Partners for which she 
worked, the AT&T National Business Unit [the "AT&T Unit" or the 
"Unit"], as a result of which a workforce reduction was taking 
place within that unit.  In her termination letter dated October 
5, 1993, Ms. Marzano was specifically told: 
     [R]evenues generated by the AT&T Business Unit have not 
     materialized as anticipated.  Over the past several 
     months, our efforts to develop new business 
     opportunities within AT&T have been largely 
     unsuccessful. . . .  [T]he CSC Consulting/AT&T Business 
     Unit is forced to reduce the number of administrative 
     personnel supporting the practice. 
Letter from Marzi to Marzano of 10/5/93. 
     According to Defendants, "[b]etween October 1993 and April 
1994, ten positions, including plaintiff's, out of approximately 
50 located in the AT&T National Business Unit in New Jersey, were 
eliminated."  Appellees' Brief at 10.  Defendants also allege 
that the Unit was ultimately merged into another Partners unit, 
the NY Metro Business Unit.  Id. at 13. 
     Ms. Marzano, however, argues that the Court should reject 
any argument made by Defendants based on the AT&T Unit's 
financial situation.  She asserts that "[t]he purported AT&T 
Business Unit is not an independent unit," but "simply part of 
CSC Partners."  Appellant's Brief at 14.  Magistrate Judge 
Hughes, who reviewed the financial documents of both CSC Partners 
and the AT&T Unit in considering a discovery motion by Ms. 
Marzano, reached a similar conclusion.  Marzano v. Computer 
Science Corporation, Inc., Civil No. 94-3102 (CSF) (D.N.J. June 
22, 1995) (mem.) (Hughes, M.J.) [hereinafter Hughes Opinion].   
     Judge Hughes found, first of all, "evidence of other 
projects where AT&T worked in conjunction with several other 
units" of CSC Partners.  Id., typescript at 5.  The expenses and 
profits from these joint projects were credited to the AT&T 
account, but "the other units were allowed to get 'shadow credit' 
for their efforts on this project."  Id.  As Judge Hughes 
explained, "[t]his is not indicative of what one would expect 
from an independent unit.  Rather, it is more indicative of many 
aspects of a corporation coming together in order to benefit the 
collective body of the Partners organization."  Id. 
     Judge Hughes also discussed evidence that the AT&T Unit's 
financial records incorporate the revenue of other supposedly 
independent units.  Id. at 5.  Judge Hughes found it 
"inexplicable how these profit and loss units can portray the 
revenues of other units as their own, while at the same time 
Defendants maintain the position that they are independent of 
each other."  Id. at 5-6. 
     Finally, Judge Hughes expressed concern over testimony by 
employees of the defendants that suggests that profits from one 
unit, the "El Segundo" pseudo unit, were allocated to that unit, 
while expenses were allocated to some other unit, so that both 
units' financial pictures would offer a distorted picture of 
their profitability.  Id. at 6. 
     Summarizing his findings, Judge Hughes explained that the 
AT&T Unit "has cooperated on projects with other units of 
Partners, it has been involved with the transfer of expenses and 
revenues between units, and it has had one of its more lucrative 
sections removed at a very convenient time."  Id. at 7.  Based on 
all this evidence, he reached the following conclusion: 
     The AT&T unit does not reach the level of independence 
     achieved by [separate, self-sufficient, independent 
     portions of a corporation].  The AT&T unit was one of 
     many symbiotic units, working, sharing and transferring 
     their resources to each other, for the benefit of the 
     whole. . . .  All in all, it appears the AT&T unit is 
     independent in name only. 
Id. 
     While the defendants do not challenge the Magistrate Judge's 
various findings, they reject Ms. Marzano's conclusion and argue 
that the existence of the AT&T Unit "is simply beyond cavil."  
Appellees' Brief at 37.  There is, indeed, ample evidence that 
CSC Partners contained a division that operated by that name.  
What is in dispute is whether the division was independent enough 
from the rest of CSC Partners to constitute an autonomous "unit," 
whose personnel actions and financial performance should or even 
could be considered separately from the rest of the firm.  As to 
this issue, Judge Hughes certainly recognized that there is a 
question of fact regarding whether the AT&T Unit was an 
independent profit-and-loss center within the firm.   
     The defendants argue that their "sworn testimony which 
described the severe financial pressures facing the AT&T National 
Business Unit stands unrebutted."  Id. at 36-37.  Interestingly 
enough, the testimony to which they refer is that of Robert 
Marzi, whose deposition took place on April 25, 1995.  App. at 
DAS 170.  It is clear that the Magistrate Judge, for one, did not 
find Mr. Marzi's testimony "unrebutted," since nearly two months 
later he issued his opinion in which he concluded that "it 
appears the AT&T unit is independent in name only."  And while it 
is literally true, as the defendants claim, that "Judge Hughes 
did not find that the reduction-in-force was based on anything 
other than the financial statements of the AT&T National Business 
Unit," Appellees' Brief at 40, we are hard-pressed to find any 
significance to this fact, since the Magistrate Judge did not 
address this question in any way.  Rather, the question before 
the Judge was whether the AT&T Unit "was a separate revenue 
generating profit and loss unit," Hughes Opinion, typescript at 
2-3, and he expressed considerable doubt on the subject.   
     By casting doubt on the validity of the AT&T Unit's 
financial statements, Judge Hughes did in fact implicitly leave 
open the possibility that the reduction in force might have been 
based on something other than the financial statements, that 
there might not have been an independent AT&T Unit, that 
accordingly the Unit could not be in financial distress while the 
rest of CSC Partners was flourishing, and that therefore no 
reduction in force could occur as a result of the alleged unit's 
alleged financial distress.  As Judge Hughes's opinion 
demonstrates, there is ample evidence in the record on the basis 
of which a finder of fact could conclude that the AT&T Unit's 
financial statements are of no value, and that the so-called AT&T 
Unit was merely a part of "the collective body of the Partners 
organization."  Id. at 5.  Based on this conclusion, a factfinder 
could further conclude that no valid and true reduction in force 
occurred in the unit since the unit had no independent existence 
of its own. 
     Because the district court conducted its analysis under the 
legal standard applicable to discrimination in a force-reduction 
setting, we presume that it concluded, as a matter of law, that a 
reduction of force did occur in the AT&T Unit.  For the reasons 
just articulated, we conclude that the issue of whether the AT&T 
Unit was the appropriate work unit and whether a reduction in 
force did occur was a question of fact that should have been 
presented to the jury and which, on summary judgment, should be 
resolved in favor of the non-moving party, i.e., Ms. Marzano.  We 
hold that the district court committed legal error when it failed 
to do so. 
                     C. Prima facie analysis 
     Because the district court could not conclude as a matter of 
law that a reduction in force (RIF) did occur, the court could 
only grant summary judgment for the defendants if it found that 
Ms. Marzano could not make a prima facie case of discrimination 
under either applicable legal setting -- i.e., reduction in force 
or no reduction in force.  However, the court did not analyze Ms. 
Marzano's allegations in the context of a "straight" layoff (as 
opposed to a layoff which takes place in a RIF context).  In 
addition, while the court did find that Ms. Marzano could not 
meet her prima facie burden in the RIF context, it committed 
legal error in reaching its conclusion. 
                                1. 
     The district court concluded that Ms. Marzano could not make 
a prima facie case in the context of a reduction in force.  The 
court correctly articulated the standard governing such 
situations in the Third Circuit: "to demonstrate a prima faciecase '[i]n 
RIF cases, the plaintiff must show he was in the 
protected class, he was qualified, he was laid off and other 
unprotected workers were retained.'"  DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 723 n.2 
(citing Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777); see also Torre, 42 F.3d at 
831; Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., 26 F.3d 428, 431 (3d Cir. 1994); 
Billet, 940 F.2d at 816 n.3. 
     The only dispute between the parties concerns the fourth 
prong of the requirement.  As the district court explained, 
     Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot establish a 
     prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination because 
     she cannot demonstrate that her employer afforded more 
     favorable treatment to nonpregnant employees.  Indeed, 
     several nonpregnant employees were terminated in 
     conjunction with the reduction in force of the AT&T 
     National Business Unit, seemingly refuting plaintiff's 
     claim that she was singled out because of her 
     pregnancy. 
 
          Plaintiff argues, however, that the relevant 
     inquiry is not whether other persons outside the 
     protected class were terminated, but whether persons 
     not in the protected class were retained. 
District Opinion, typescript at 5. 
     The district court acknowledged that our opinions on the 
subject have enunciated the standard in "the precise language 
articulated by plaintiff."  Id.  However, the court rejected a 
"literal interpretation" of our language on the ground that under 
such a test, "every plaintiff in a protected group would be 
allowed a trial simply because he was discharged during a 
reduction in force."  Id.  Presumably to protect the judiciary 
from a flurry of frivolous discrimination lawsuits by disgruntled 
laid-off employees, the court adopted a different requirement 
from that which our explicit language called for: 
     [T]o establish a prima facie case in the context of a 
     work-force reduction, a plaintiff must do more than 
     merely show that unprotected employees were retained in 
     their positions; the plaintiff must produce some 
     additional evidence that he was singled out for 
     discharge because of his protected status. 
Id., typescript at 5-6. 
     Finding that "plaintiff has merely asserted that while she 
was terminated, other employees were retained," id., typescript 
at 6, the court concluded that Ms. Marzano had failed to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and that as a 
result the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on this 
claim. 
     Because it departs from the law of this Circuit and because 
it subverts the analytical framework designed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in McDonnell Douglas, we reject the requirement of 
"additional evidence" imposed by the district court on Ms. 
Marzano, and hold that the court erroneously concluded that Ms. 
Marzano had failed to meet her prima facie burden in the 
reduction-in-force context. 
                                2. 
     As an initial matter, the district court was not free to 
depart from "the precise language" articulated by this court or 
to "decline[] to adopt the literal interpretation" of our 
jurisprudence unless, of course, a more recent Supreme Court case 
requires such a departure or our own precedent in other cases 
suggests a modification in certain circumstances.  Defendants 
argue that the "additional evidence" requirement is consistent 
with Third Circuit precedent, and point for support to certain 
portions of our opinion in Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  See Appellees' Brief at 28.  However, the discussion 
in Hook to which they direct our attention concerns the elements 
required to show employment discrimination in a so-called "mixed- 
motives" case, and in no way bears on the elements of a primafacie case in 
the type of discrimination case that is before us, 
which is known as a "pretext" case.  See Hooks, 28 F.3d at 375.  
In other words, Hooks is of no relevance to the instant case. 
                                3. 
     We reject the "additional evidence" requirement not solely 
on hierarchical grounds, however, but also because it subverts 
the entire analytical framework constructed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, this Court and other circuits for the consideration of 
summary judgment motions in employment discrimination cases. 
                               (a) 
     What makes an employer's personnel action unlawful 
discrimination is the intent behind that action.  See U.S. Postal 
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) 
("The 'factual inquiry' . . . is '[whether] the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.'") (citation 
omitted).  For obvious reasons, it is extremely difficult -- not 
to say impossible -- to establish directly the motivation of 
one's employer, or that of any third party.  See id. at 716 ("All 
courts have recognized that the question facing triers of fact in 
discrimination cases is both sensitive and difficult. . . .  
There will seldom be 'eyewitness testimony as to the employer's 
mental processes.").   There are exceptions, of course, such as 
when a plaintiff can produce the proverbial "smoking gun" -- for 
instance, an internal memorandum instructing the personnel 
director not to hire persons belonging to a certain protected 
class.  But our legal scheme against discrimination would be 
little more than a toothless tiger if the courts were to require 
such direct evidence of discrimination.  As we explained in 
Chipollini, "we do not require direct proof of . . . 
discrimination because it is often unavailable or difficult to 
find. . . .  'Even an employer who knowingly discriminates on the 
basis of [protected status] may leave no written records 
revealing the forbidden motive and may communicate it orally to 
no one.'"  814 F.2d at 899 (citing LaMontagne v. American 
Convenience Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
     As a result, most employment discrimination lawsuits seek to 
prove intent through inference.  In the typical case, the 
plaintiff attempts to establish the employer's motivation by a 
process of elimination.  In other words, because plaintiffs 
generally cannot present evidence affirmatively pointing to their 
employer's actual reason for taking certain action against them, 
they must instead try to show that no reason other than 
discrimination is plausible, and that accordingly discrimination 
must have been the reason.  To enable a jury to reach this 
conclusion, plaintiffs must establish three elements: (1) that 
their employer took an adverse employment action against them; 
(2) that the facts of the case are compatible with discrimination 
being the reason; (3) that the employer is unable to provide an 
alternative nondiscriminatory reason for the action, or that its 
stated reason is false.  Since there must be some reason for the 
employer's action and since no reason other than discrimination 
has been shown to be plausible, this scheme allows a jury to 
infer that discrimination must be the reason. 
     The burden-shifting analysis enunciated by the Supreme Court 
in McDonnell Douglas and developed and refined in subsequent 
judicial forays into the subject is designed to ensure that 
plaintiff has enough evidence to construct the chain of 
inferences described in the previous paragraph, and therefore get 
to trial.  In the first instance, the plaintiff must establish a 
prima facie case.  The evidentiary burden at this stage is rather 
modest: it is to demonstrate to the court that plaintiff's 
factual scenario is compatible with discriminatory intent -- 
i.e., that discrimination could be a reason for the employer's 
action.  As we have held on numerous occasions, this initial 
burden "is not intended to be onerous."  Sempier, 45 F.3d at 728 
(citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253); see also Torre, 42 F.3d at 829 
(describing prima facie case as "relatively simple"); McKenna v. 
Pacific Rail Service, 32 F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); 
Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 118 (describing prima facie case as 
"easily made out"). 
     Jumping over this first hurdle, however, has important 
consequences.  By meeting his or her prima facie burden, the 
plaintiff earns the right, as in a poker game, to require the 
employer to show its hand -- that is, to offer an explanation 
other than discrimination why the employee suffered an adverse 
employment action.  It is as if plaintiff told the employer, "I 
cannot get into your mind to prove with certainty that you acted 
against me based on a discriminatory motive.  You, on the other 
hand, know the reason why you acted against me. I have done the 
best I can, which is to show that discrimination could have been 
the motive.  Therefore, it is your turn to prove me wrong by 
articulating the non-discriminatory reason for your action."  If 
the employer is unable to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason, 
plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment or judgment as a matter 
of law, as the case may be; if the employer proffers a reason and 
the plaintiff can produce enough evidence to enable a reasonable 
factfinder to conclude that the proffered reason is false, 
plaintiff has earned the right to present his or her case to the 
jury. 
     In the context of a reduction in force, we have held that to 
demonstrate a prima facie case, "the plaintiff must show he was 
in the protected class, he was qualified, he was laid off and 
other unprotected workers were retained."  DiBiase, 48 F.3d at 
723 n.2; Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 777.  The third element, that 
plaintiff was laid off, establishes that he or she suffered an 
adverse employment action.  The second and fourth elements, that 
plaintiff was qualified and that other unprotected workers were 
retained, establishes that plaintiff was treated differently from 
his or her colleagues, and introduces a question: Why?  In other 
words, it raises the question of what is distinctive about 
plaintiff that caused the employer to treat him or her 
differently from his or her colleagues.  The first element, that 
she was in the protected class, identifies one possible answer, 
one condition in which she differs from her colleagues who were 
retained: her protected status.  It does not necessarily 
demonstrate that her protected status is the reason why she was 
treated differently; but it makes it a plausible explanation, one 
that is compatible with the facts of the case. 
     At that point, the burden switches to the employer, who must 
proffer an alternative explanation for treating the plaintiff 
differently from those unprotected employees who were retained.  
Chief Justice (then Justice) Rehnquist explained the reason for 
placing that burden on the employer as follows: 
     A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an 
     inference of discrimination only because we presume 
     these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely 
     than not based on the consideration of impermissible 
     factors.  And we are willing to presume this largely 
     because we know from our experience that more often 
     than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary 
     manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a 
     business setting.  Thus, when all legitimate reasons 
     for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as 
     possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more 
     likely than not the employer, who we generally assume 
     acts only with some reason, based his decision on an 
     impermissible consideration such as race. 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); 
see also Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 897. 
     When the employer proffers a reason for treating the 
plaintiff differently from his or her colleagues that the 
factfinder rejects, McDonnell Douglas and its progeny allow the 
factfinder to conclude that since the employer was unable to give 
any satisfactory reason for its action, the discriminatory reason 
suggested by the plaintiff must be the one. 
     As noted earlier, the district court rejected the primafacie test 
that we articulated in Armbruster on the ground that 
"every plaintiff in a protected group would be allowed a trial 
simply because he was discharged during a reduction in force," 
District Opinion at 5, and therefore held that Ms. Marzano needed 
to produce "additional evidence" to meet her prima facie burden. 
Id. at 6.  In so concluding, the court committed reversible legal 
error. 
                               (b) 
     First of all, the court is simply wrong when it suggests 
that our test would open the judicial floodgates and let every 
plaintiff in a protected group who is discharged go to trial and 
defeat summary judgment.  Rather, the effect of our rule is that 
in every case where an employee in a protected class is laid off 
as part of a reduction in force while unprotected colleagues are 
retained, the employer may be compelled to state the 
nondiscriminatory reason -- assuming there is one -- for the 
action.   
     It is true that if plaintiff can then produce evidence to 
cast doubt on the employer's stated reason, the case should go to 
trial.  But such is the nature of the evidentiary beast.  
Employment discrimination cases center around a single question: 
why did the employer take an adverse employment action against 
plaintiff?  Because this "is clearly a factual question," 
Chipollini, 814 F.2d at 899, summary judgment is in fact rarely 
appropriate in this type of case.  Simply "by pointing to 
evidence which calls into question the defendant's intent, the 
plaintiff raises an issue of material fact which, if genuine, is 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment."  Id.  See Sempier, 45 
F.3d at 732-33 (cases in which plaintiff attacks employer's 
stated reasons for adverse employment action "must be resolved by 
a jury and cannot be resolved on summary judgment"). 
     To require plaintiff to produce "additional evidence" of 
discrimination at the prima facie stage, as the district court 
did in this instance, would be a cure worse than the disease.  It 
would topple the complex evidentiary edifice constructed by the 
Supreme Court, and impose on plaintiff the very burden that 
McDonnell Douglas sought to avoid -- that of uncovering a smoking 
gun. 
     The defendants contend that the standard articulated by the 
court "does not require, as plaintiff suggests, a 'smoking gun.'"  
Appellees' Brief at 29.  As to what other type of evidence might 
satisfy the "additional evidence" requirement that the district 
court enunciated, however, the Defendants do not say; instead, 
they cite several cases from other circuits with no comment.  
None of these cases, however, comes close to offering an answer.  
See, e.g., Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 59 F.3d 759, 763 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (requiring plaintiff to "come forward with additional 
evidence that age was a factor in his termination," without 
specifying what form this "other evidence" might take). 
     The Eighth Circuit, in an earlier case, did suggest that 
     [s]uch showing could be made . . . by statistical 
     evidence (as, for example, where a pattern of forced 
     early retirement or failure to promote older employees 
     can be shown) or circumstantial evidence (such as a 
     demonstration of a preference for younger employees in 
     the business organization. 
Holley v. Sanyo Manufacturing, Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1166 (8th 
Cir. 1985). 
     However, we find this answer unsatisfactory in the present 
context.  First, except in the largest organizations it might be 
more difficult to compile meaningful statistics regarding 
pregnant women than for older employees.  Second, we find the 
imposition of such a requirement overly onerous at the prima 
facie stage.  For this reason, we predict that New Jersey would 
decline to follow the lead of those federal circuits that have 
adopted the "additional evidence" requirement. 
                               (c) 
     Defendants argue that the district court properly required 
"additional evidence," but offer, inter alia, a more nuanced 
argument than that articulated by the court.  They argue that the 
fourth element of the prima facie case "encompasses the 
requirement that plaintiff show that similarly situatedunprotected 
employees were retained."  Appellees' Brief at 26 
(citing Torre, 42 F.3d at 831), and that there were no such 
similarly situated employees in the AT&T Unit.  Appellees' Brief 
at 27.  The implication, the defendants argue, is that 
     because of her unique role, plaintiff cannot establish, 
     as she must, that other similarly situated, unprotected 
     employees were retained. 
 
          Because plaintiff was unable to show that other 
     similarly situated, unprotected employees were treated 
     more favorably, the District Court correctly ruled that 
     plaintiff must make some "additional showing" of 
     discrimination . . . . 
Id. at 27-28. 
     We reject Defendants' argument.  First of all, Torre did not 
create any legal requirement such as the one that Defendants 
attempt to impose on Ms. Marzano.  The Court in that case simply 
remarked that "when Torre was terminated in the reduction in 
force, other, similarly-situated [sic] but younger employees were 
retained by Casio."  Torre, 42 F.3d at 831.  The fact that 
similarly situated employees were retained certainly strengthens 
the plaintiff's case, and makes more urgent the employer's task 
of providing a reason other than discrimination for its different 
treatment of plaintiff.  But the Court did not create a new legal 
requirement in the process, and Defendants can cite no case in 
this Circuit, nor do we know of any, where it was described as a 
requirement. 
     Moreover, we reject Defendants' argument because it would 
seriously undermine legal protections against discrimination.  
Under their scheme, any employee whose employer can for some 
reason or other classify him or her as "unique" would no longer 
be allowed to demonstrate discrimination inferentially, but would 
be in the oft-impossible situation of having to offer direct 
proof of discrimination.  We see no value in, and no mandate in 
our jurisprudence for, such a requirement. 
     This is not to say that the "uniqueness" of an employee is 
irrelevant to the ultimate outcome.  Consider, for instance, the 
situation of an employee who performs tasks in the firm that no 
one else performs, and whose functions become obsolete.  In that 
case, the employee's "uniqueness" may explain why he or she, and 
not an unprotected colleague, was terminated.  Such a scenario, 
however, goes to the employer's reason for its action, and may be 
presented to the judge after the plaintiff has made his or her 
prima facie case, when the burden switches to the employer to 
proffer a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. 
     All employees can be characterized as unique in some ways 
and as sharing common ground with "similarly situated employees" 
in some other ways, depending on the attributes on which one 
focusses, and the degree of specificity with which one considers 
that employee's qualifications, skills, tasks and level of 
performance.  The relevant issue for our purposes is not whether 
there is some way in which an employee can be classified as 
unique but, rather, whether the employee can be classified as 
unique in some way relevant to his or her layoff.  This question, 
in turn, cannot be considered independently from the reasons 
proffered for the employee's termination.  Therefore, arguments 
as to the employee's uniqueness should be considered in 
conjunction with, and as part of, the employer's rebuttal -- not 
at the prima facie stage.  See Healy, 860 F.2d at 1214 n.1 
(noting that "because the prima facie case is easily made out, 
the prima facie case is rarely the focus of the ultimate 
disagreement.  Rather, 'the exigencies of a reduction-in-force 
can best be analyzed at the stage where the employer puts on 
evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for the [discharge].") 
(citing Coburn v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 
343 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983)). 
                               (d) 
     Because we conclude that the test that this Court has 
articulated in the past to establish a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination in a reduction-in-force context 
properly advances the evidentiary scheme devised by the Supreme 
Court, and because we find that this test satisfactorily protects 
the interests of employer and employee, we believe that New 
Jersey would adopt the test articulated by this Court in DiBiaseand 
Armbruster, and find that the district court erred when it 
rejected established Third Circuit law. 
                                4. 
     Furthermore, because we find that the district court 
improperly concluded that Ms. Marzano could not meet her primafacie burden 
in the RIF context, and because the court did not 
consider whether she could meet her burden in a non-RIF context, 
we hold that the district court erroneously granted Defendants' 
summary judgment on the discrimination ground and remand for 
further consideration. 
 
             V. The Family & Medical Leave Act claim 
     Ms. Marzano's second claim is that the defendants violated 
her right, under the New Jersey Family Leave Act, "to family 
leave . . . [and] to be restored by [the defendants] to [her 
previous position] or to an equivalent position of like 
seniority, status, employment benefits, pay, and other terms and 
conditions of employment."  N.J.S.A.  34:11B-7.  While the Act 
does contain an exception when "the employer experiences a 
reduction in force or layoff and the employee would have lost his 
position had the employee not been on leave," id., Ms. Marzano 
argues that the exception does not apply because the defendants' 
claim of financial distress, which was the stated reason for the 
alleged force reduction, is false. 
     The district court rejected Ms. Marzano's argument that a 
genuine issue of material fact existed on the ground that she 
could not defeat the motion for summary judgment 
     simply by challenging the employer's motivation for 
     reducing its work force.  Regardless of whether it was 
     financially induced or whether it was motivated by some 
     other legitimate business reason, there is no dispute 
     that Partners experienced a reduction in force during 
     the time plaintiff was out on maternity leave. 
Op. at 7-8.  The district court concluded that the force- 
reduction provision of the Family & Medical Leave Act applied, 
and that summary judgment was warranted.  Id. 
     As we discussed at length supra in Part IV, there is a 
genuine question of fact regarding whether or not Ms. Marzano's 
employer experienced a reduction in force.  Therefore, we cannot 
conclude on this record that the statutory exception applies to 
Ms. Marzano's termination. 
 
                 VI. The breach-of-contract claim 
     Ms. Marzano's final allegation is that her layoff was in 
breach of an implied contract whereby "an employee is entitled to 
be restored to the same or equivalent position after taking 
maternity leave."   
     The district court granted summary judgment on this claim on 
two grounds.  First, the court found that "plaintiff has failed 
to identify a written policy wherein her employer impliedly 
promised that any employee taking a family leave of absence would 
be restored to the position held prior to commencing the leave 
period."  District Opinion at 9.  Second, the court concluded 
that "a breach of implied contract claim . . . is not cognizable 
in the context of a work force reduction."  Id. at 9. 
     Ms. Marzano grounds her claim in New Jersey common law, 
under which 
     when an employer of a substantial number of employees 
     circulates a manual that, when fairly read, provides 
     that certain benefits are an incident of employment 
     (including, especially, job security provisions), the 
     judiciary, instead of "grudgingly" conceding the 
     enforceability of those provisions, should construe 
     them in accordance with the reasonable expectations of 
     the employees. 
Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. 
1985). 
     She argues that the court erroneously granted summary 
judgment on this count because, inter alia, a memorandum 
circulated on August 16, 1993 by CSC Partners management to all 
employees "expressly states that an employee is entitled to be 
restored to the same or equivalent position after taking family 
leave," Appellant's brief at 49, and "[b]ased on that policy, 
[she] reasonably expected to be returned to her job after taking 
family leave."  Id. 
     There is no categorical test to determine whether an 
employment manual could give rise to reasonable expectations of 
employees that it confers enforceable obligations.  Witkowski v. 
Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 643 A.2d 546, 550 (N.J. 1994).  Among the 
important factors that the court should consider, however, are 
"the definiteness and comprehensiveness of the [policy] and the 
context of the manual's preparation and distribution."  Id.  
     In this instance, the document to which Ms. Marzano directs 
our attention is not an employment manual but a two-page 
memorandum, a far less formal document.  In addition, while the 
memorandum does state, inter alia, that "[a]n employee returning 
from FMLA leave is entitled to be restored to the same position 
held prior to taking FMLA leave, or to an equivalent position, 
with the same pay and benefits," App. at A267, it is very clear 
from the text of the memorandum that this sentence merely 
notifies employees of a provision contained in the Family and 
Medical Leave Act.  In other words, the context of the memorandum 
was to apprise CSC Partners employees of their rights under New 
Jersey law, not to inform them of any new "benefits" that the 
company decided to grant its employees.   
     For this reason, we conclude that the district court 
properly granted summary judgment on this count.    
 
                       VII. CSC's liability 
     Defendants argue on appeal that Ms. Marzano improperly named 
Computer Science Corp. as a defendant and that the claims against 
CSC must be dismissed as a result.  Appellees' Brief at 46-47.  
Ms. Marzano argues, however, that there is a "genuine issue of 
material fact regarding the interrelationship of CSC and CSC 
Partners," Appellant's Reply Brief at 24, and that accordingly 
CSC was properly named as a defendant.  Id. at 22. 
     It is a "fundamental proposition[]" of New Jersey corporate 
law that a corporation is a separate entity from its 
shareholders, State of New Jersey v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 
164 (N.J. 1983) (citing Lyon v. Barrett, 89 N.J. 294, 300 
(1982)), and that shareholders are insulated from the liabilities 
of the corporate enterprise.  Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d at 164.  
"Even in the case of a parent corporation and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, limited liability normally will not be abrogated."  
Id. (citing Muller v. Seaboard Commercial Corp., 5 N.J. 28, 34 
(1950)). 
     A court may not depart from this principle and pierce the 
corporate veil unless it finds that "a subsidiary was 'a mere 
instrumentality of the parent corporation.'"  Ventron Corp., 468 
A.2d at 164 (citing Mueller, 5 N.J. at 34-35).  The requisite 
finding is that "the parent so dominated the subsidiary that it 
had no separate existence but was merely a conduit for the 
parent."  Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d at 164. 
     We are aware of no case in New Jersey or the Third Circuit 
on the subject of piercing the corporate veil in the context of 
an employment discrimination lawsuit.  Other courts, however, 
have considered the issue.  Closest to home, a Pennsylvania 
federal district court held that "[w]here separate corporate 
entities are so interrelated and integrated in their activities, 
labor relations, and management, it is clear that for Title VII 
jurisdictional purposes they may be treated as a single 
employer."  Ratcliffe v. Insurance Co. of North America, 482 F. 
Supp. 759, 764 (E.D. Pa. 1980).   
     Other courts have addressed similar questions and conducted 
similar types of analysis.  In Johnson v. Flowers Industries, 
Inc., 814 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1987), the plaintiffs brought an age 
discrimination lawsuit against the company that employed them, 
West Virginia Baking Company (WVBC), as well as WVBC's parent- 
company, Flowers Industries, and another Flowers subsidiary.  The 
court, after noting that "when a subsidiary hires employees, 
there is a strong presumption that the subsidiary, not the parent 
company, is the employer," id. at 980, noted that the presumption 
could be overcome if the parent-company "exercises excessive 
control in one of two ways."  Id. at 981.   
     First, the parent could control the employment 
     practices and decisions of the subsidiary.  If the 
     parent company hired and fired the subsidiary 
     employees, routinely shifted them between the two 
     companies, and supervised their daily operations, it 
     would be hard to find that the parent was not their 
     employer.  Second, the parent might so dominate the 
     subsidiary's operations that the parent and the 
     subsidiary are one entity and thus one employer.  For 
     example, the subsidiary may be highly integrated with 
     the parent's business operations, as evidenced by the 
     commingling of funds and assets, the use of the same 
     work force and business offices for both corporations, 
     and the severe undercapitalization of the subsidiary.  
     The parent might also fail to observe such basic 
     corporate formalities as keeping separate books and 
     holding separate shareholder and board meetings. 
Id.  The court concluded that "the courts have found parent 
corporations to be employers only in extraordinary 
circumstances."  Id.; see also Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 
1357, 1363 (10th Cir. 1993) (same). 
     In Daniels v. Kerr McGee Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Wyo. 
1993), the plaintiff sought to pierce the corporate veil against 
his employer's parent-company in his wrongful discharge action 
based on several facts demonstrating interrelatedness: 
interlocking directorates between the two corporate entities; 
reference in the parent's annual report to the operations of the 
subsidiary, and inclusion of the revenues generated by the 
subsidiary; management by the parent of the benefit plan for the 
subsidiary's employees; use of the same corporate logo; shared 
corporate headquarters; medical examination of the plaintiff by a 
doctor employed by the parent.  Id. at 1136-37.  The court, while 
acknowledging that "there is some degree of interdependence 
between these two corporations," concluded that the facts cited 
by plaintiff could not "overcome the strong presumption of 
liability."  Id. at 1137.  The court noted that plaintiff 
conceded that he was an employee of the subsidiary only, that the 
subsidiary was adequately capitalized and had sufficient assets 
to satisfy any potential judgment against it, and that "the 
decision to terminate the plaintiff was made by the management of 
the subsidiary and that the parent had no role in that decision."  
Id. 
     By contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did 
pierce the corporate veil in a lawsuit alleging improper 
termination on the grounds that the parent-company "dominated" 
its subsidiary and "effectuated [the plaintiffs'] discharges," 
and that the employees were terminated as the result of personnel 
actions ordered by the CEO and the Board of the parent-company.  
Gorrill v. Icelandair/Flugleidir, 761 F.2d 847, 853 (2d Cir. 
1985). 
     In the instant case, it is undisputed that at the time of 
her layoff, Ms. Marzano was an employee of CSC Partners, and CSC 
Partners only.  While she suggests that there is a question of 
fact regarding the interrelatedness of the two companies that 
should go to the jury, Appellant's Reply Brief at 23, she points 
only to the following evidence to support her position: first, 
that she was initially hired by CSC, and "continued to believe 
she was a CSC employee until the day she was fired," id.; second, 
that while Defendants claim that her division merged with CSC 
Partners sometime between 1991 and 1992, "from the employee's 
perspective, there was no notice of any changes or explanation of 
what [the merger] meant, if anything," id. at 24; third, that she 
continued to receive paychecks from CSC as late as May 1992, and 
continued to belong to the CSC pension plan, id.; fourth, that 
"CSC Partners['s] maternity leave policy was based on information 
provided by CSC Corporate on the FMLA," id.; and, finally, that 
she continued to have regular involvement with CSC corporate as 
part of her job responsibilities."  Id. 
     Even if we accept all of Ms. Marzano's statements as true, 
we conclude that these facts, taken together, do not demonstrate 
that CSC and CSC Partners were "so interrelated and integrated in 
their activities, labor relations and management" that we should 
pierce the corporate veil.  Her only direct involvement with CSC 
at the time of her layoff was her participation in CSC's pension 
plan.  In addition, she offers no evidence that CSC was in any 
way, shape or form involved in CSC Partners' management or 
personnel decisions.  For this reason, we conclude that the 
charges against CSC should be dismissed. 
 
                         VIII. Conclusion 
     For the reasons expressed above, we reach the following 
conclusions.  First, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment 
for CSC Partners on the breach-of-contract count.  Second, we 
will vacate the grant of summary judgment for CSC Partners on the 
discrimination count, and remand to the district court for 
further action consistent with this opinion.  Third, we will 
reverse the grant of summary judgment for CSC Partners on the 
FMLA count, and remand to the district court to proceed to trial 
on this issue.  Finally, we will remand and instruct the district 
court to enter an order dismissing all the claims against CSC. 
           
